Mind the Brain Podcast Episode 01 – The Neuroscience of Art, Beauty, and Aesthetics

Hello readers, my name is Ruchir Shah, and I am the newest contributor to the Mind the Brain blog. I am a neuroscientist by training, but have a passion for story telling as well. I will be contributing a regular neuroscience podcast series to this blog, and I want to thank my fellow Mind the Brain bloggers for the opportunity to present my work. I’m delighted to be joining this excellent group of scientists!

For my first podcast in this series, I talk to Bevil Conway, who is an Associate Professor of Neuroscience at Wellesley College. Bevil has studied visual art as well as the mechanisms of visual perception, and has an active interest in the intersection between those two disciplines.In this podcast, we discuss the nascent field of “Neuroaesthetics”, and whether neuroscience can actually help us understand our experiences of beauty and aesthetics.

The term “aesthetics” means different things to different people, and from a neuroscience perspective it can involve sensory perception, emotional processing, attention, decision-making, and reward. We discuss how philosophers and neuroscientists have attempted to define this concept, and what we currently do and do not know about the neural basis for experiencing beauty. We then dive into a neuroscientific analysis of artwork, and whether we can glean any universal principles of aesthetics from such an approach. Finally, we discuss some fascinating case studies of how specific brain diseases or lesions can actually enhance art production, and what this might mean for how we perceive and experience beauty.

You can listen to and download the podcast here.

I hope you enjoy, and if you’re interested in learning more, you can read more of Bevil’s work on neuroaesthetics here, here, and here.

 

Category: Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Newly found CLARITY

Most of us would receive the news of not getting a grant with dread and frustration. Yesterday, finding out I did not get to the second round of the Marsden Fund actually made me feel good. There is a sense of satisfaction about getting funded to do the work I want to do, but at the same time, it does not leave a lot of room to explore new ideas or follow side-tracks that might look interesting.  And it is this serendipity of discovery that I always loved about science. So I am looking at this as an opportunity for a sort of sabbatical during which I plan to go down my “need to explore this further” list “.The first thing I am going to do is try to explore this CLARITY[1] method.

One of the problems with studying the brain is that the neurons are small and have a rather complex architecture. To be able to look at neurons under the microscope, we need to cut the tissue into small slices, thin enough to let the microscope light go through. But neurons don’t seem to care much about the limits of optical physics, and tend to have dendrites and axons that usually don’t fit in each of those single slices. The task then is to try to reconstruct the shape of the neurons and follow their axons by mapping the bits and pieces from serially adjacent slices. I tend to enjoy that work, but it is terribly tedious and time consuming. Another problem with classical histology is that to be able to render the tissue transparent we need to get rid of the fat. Look up almost any paper using classical histology for the light microscope and you will find the typical sentence “the tissue was dehydrated, placed in xylene and covesliped” or something to that effect. The main reason to take the water out of the tissue is to be able to put it in xylene so that we can get rid of the fat. Silverbacks like me call that clearing. This step makes the tissue optically transparent. But even then, there is a limit on how thick the sections can be because to actually “see” the cells they need to be stained with something or other – either a general dye that stains all cells or more specific chemicals that label particular components of the cells (like a  membrane protein or part of the cytoskeleton). These chemicals need to diffuse through the tissue to stain the right structure and that places a limit on the thickness.

Enter the scene Kwanghun Chung and the rest of the CLARITY team [1]. They found a way of removing the fat from the tissue so as to increase the tissue permeability of labeling molecules and also letting light go through thick slabs of tissue. But they needed to remove the fat, which helps hold the tissue together, without letting the tissue fall apart. So the first thing they did is “fix” the non fatty part of the tissue using a hydrogel that holds the non-fatty parts of the cell together. Once the fats are removed from the tissue, light can get through and chemicals can diffuse well. They show results of their technique in a young mouse brain – and the results are remarkable indeed.

shackles

CC-BY-SA Heather Katsoulis on Flikr

So my part of my unfunded-mini-sabbatical-time will be spent trying to see if I get CLARITY to work in my lab. This technique is science hacking at its best and I can think of heaps of things I’d like to do with it.

Perhaps not getting funded is a bit of a blessing. We spend a lot of time writing grants, then even more operating the grant, training and supervising staff, writing reports, balancing financial sheets, and doing what we promised to be doing in the grant. A colleague of mine always reminds me that we need to reinvent ourselves as scientists at least every three years . I think he is right – every now and then we need to remove the shackles of what we do and explore other directions. So, I will take this mini-unfunded-sabbatical just to try to do that. Taking John Pickering’s words slightly out of context:

…science at its best is not shackled but free to explore and expand.  Science by its very nature is at a frontier and a journey into lands unknown.  A pathway cannot be chosen for it and any attempt to do so will as often as not go straight past the pot of gold.

Back to the roots. Back to doing some un-shackled  science.

 

[1] Chung, K., Wallace, J., Kim, S.-Y., Kalyanasundaram, S., Andalman, A. S., Davidson, T. J., … Deisseroth, K. (2013). Structural and molecular interrogation of intact biological systems. Nature, advance online publication. DOI 10.1038/nature12107
Category: Uncategorized | Tagged , , | Leave a comment

Hearing Voices: PTSD and Auditory Hallucinations

One of the greatest benefits of being affiliated with a major university is the opportunities that often arise to engage in interdisciplinary collaboration.  I was invited, by Composer and researcher Jonathan Berger, to present at the seventh annual Music and Brain Symposium, which was held earlier this month at Stanford University.  Jonathan is the Denning Family Provostial Professor in Music at Stanford, and is co-director of the Stanford Institute for Creativity and the Arts (SICA) and The Center for Computer Research in Music and Acoustics (CCRMA).

This year’s symposium was titled, “Hearing Voices,” and brought together an interdisciplinary panel (from the fields of music, psychology, anthropology, medical humanities and psychiatry) of researchers, scholars, and writers to examine the phenomena of auditory hallucinations.

Painting by Vera Gutkina from VISITATIONS: THEOTOKIA and THE WAR REPORTER

Painting by Vera Gutkina from VISITATIONS: THEOTOKIA and THE WAR REPORTER

Listening to the presentations of my co-panelists I was offered a rich array of diverse perspectives on auditory hallucinations and a unique opportunity to view this subject matter through the lens of colleagues who all come at this phenomenon from different angles: Diana Deutsch (University of California, San Diego), presented on Phantom Words, Musical Hallucinations and the Speech to Song Illusion; Chris Chafe (Stanford University), presented on The Acoustics of Imaginary Sound; Angela Woods (Durham University), spoke on the Taxonomies of Voice-Hearing; Judith Ford (University of California, San Francisco), spoke on The Phenomenology of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and how internal experiences can sound external; Daniel B. Smith (The College of New Rochelle), gave an account of How Hallucination Got Its Name and Tanya Luhrmann (Stanford University) presented on her research regarding auditory hallucinations that involve hearing God.

My own presentation was preceded by a talk from Pulitzer Prize-winning combat journalist Paul Watson, as he spoke of his own lived experience of hearing the haunting voice of an American soldier whose corpse he photographed in the streets of Mogadishu in 1993. Paul’s heart wrenching story offered a personal view on the topic I was talking about: PTSD and Auditory Hallucinations, a controversial issue in my own field of psychiatry.

( For links to these presenters and video of the actual presentations please go to this link: http://www.ustream.tv/channel/music-and-brain-symposium)

Hallucinations and Combat Veterans with PTSD

Among combat veterans with PTSD, 30-40% report auditory hallucinations (AH). AH are more frequent in combat veterans with chronic PTSD and it has been suggested that this may reflect a distinct subtype of PTSD that may be under recognized for two reasons: first, patients are reluctant to report AH and, second, more emphasis has, traditionally, been placed on the intrusive images associated with PTSD and less on intrusive auditory hallucinations.

It is important to recognize that such patients do not have the overt changes in affect or bizarre delusions characteristic of other psychoses e.g. schizophrenia.  AH in PTSD appears to be seen more in veterans with higher combat exposure and more intense PTSD symptoms and who report more severe symptoms of hyperarousal. The AH are typically: ego-dystonic; contribute to an increases sense of isolation and shame; associated with feelings of lack of controllability; consist of combat-related themes and guilt; non bizarre; not associated with thought disorders and, overall, more refractory to treatment interventions.

Some researchers have pushed to establish the validity of PTSD with secondary psychotic features (PTSD-SP) as a separate diagnostic entity arguing that the Delineation of PTSD-SP from PTSD is notable and there are some biological studies that support the validity as a separate diagnostic entity.  Still, there is currently not enough evidence to support a separate diagnostic entity.

Part of the controversy, in the field of PTSD, is to do with how we explain the presence of AH in PTSD.  Recently, (and I tend to favor this theory over others) it has been suggested that hearing voices in PTSD may be better conceived of as a dissociative rather than a psychotic phenomenon and that dissociation is significantly related to AH and may indeed be a potential mediating mechanism for AH in PTSD.

The daylong event ended with “Visitations,” an evening-length program featuring two chamber opera commissions from Jonathan Berger, and librettist Dan O’Brien,  In keeping with the theme of the symposium, both operas, The War Reporter and Theotokia, present the stories of two men, each haunted by inner voices. The War Reporter depicts the true story of Pulitzer Prize-winning combat journalist Paul Watson, as he seeks to rid himself of the haunting voice of an American soldier whose corpse he photographed in the streets of Mogadishu in 1993.

 

Category: Psychiatry, PTSD | Tagged , , , | 6 Comments

Cancer as a psychological trauma

2012-04-05-ptsd1Does diagnosis and treatment of cancer leave many people suffering from PTSD? Cancer is routinely portrayed as a psychological trauma in the media. Dramatizing it as traumatic is a standard way of introducing psychological studies of cancer. A diagnosis of cancer can be life-altering, but the assumption that it typically proves to be traumatic does not survive a confrontation with available evidence.

Moreover, the casual assumption that cancer is traumatic has been used to turn patients’ normal reactions to a diagnosis into a mental health issue, frighten persons who suffer from cancer, and promote bogus therapies. It has been used to prescribe how cancer patients should react to their disease, not just describe their reactions.

The invention of cancer as psychological trauma

It may come as a surprise that the connection between cancer and psychological trauma only appeared in the scientific literature around 1990. A search of “cancer” AND “(psychological trauma or PTSD)” on Thomson Reuters Web of Science can be used to create a graphic display in which only a few studies in the early 90s steadily increase thereafter.

publications each year cancer trauma

Publications per year Cancer + Trauma

The notion that cancer is traumatic came into play in the late 1980s when changes were contemplated to the DSM criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Diagnosis of PTSD previously required exposure to an event outside the range of normal human experience. The DSM-III specifically ruled out chronic illness as such an event. However, it was anticipated that this exclusion would be removed in the next revision of DSM. The assumption was not that physical illness was necessarily traumatic, but if certain criteria were met, that physical illness could be considered a cause of PTSD.

Results from one of the DSM-IV PTSD field trials reported that cancer survivors had a higher rate of PTSD than comparison-controls from the community. However, it had a small sample because of a poor recruitment rate. A total of only 27 cancer survivors were matched with community controls, and the entire sample consisted of white suburbanite women. Only one of the cancer survivors and none of the community controls had current PTSD, but six of the survivors and none of the community controls met criterion for lifetime PTSD. This is hardly strong evidence, and there is no indication in this report whether any effort was made to assess whether the cancer survivors considered cancer outside the range of normal experience.

An early interview study of 160 breast cancer patients found low rates of PTSD, with only 3% of the women meeting stringent criteria for PTSD. Relaxing of the symptom criteria only yielded another six cases (3.8%). The authors concluded that cancer and its treatment might not fit well with the requirement of an event outside of normal human experience. In addition to interviewing patients, the investigators administered a number of self-report questionnaires and found that these breast cancer patients reported considerable psychological distress. Noting the discrepancy with the outcomes of a careful interview, the investigators cautioned against accepting self-report questionnaire data as equivalent to the results of the diagnostic interview.

The criteria for PTSD that were eventually adopted for DSM-IV in 1994 can be found here.

The DSM committee decided that assessment of an event as being outside the range of normal human experience was unreliable. So, two more precise requirements were set for the precipitating traumatic event: A1, that the event involved actual or threatened death or serious injury or threat to the physical integrity of self or others; and A2, that the person reacted with intense fear, helplessness or horror.

A diagnosis requires that a constellation of symptoms be present, not just a minimum number. There has to be at least one recurrence symptom such as a distressing recollection, dream, or feeling as if the traumatic event was reoccurring; at least three avoidance symptoms or numbing of general responsiveness; and at least two arousal symptoms such as difficulty falling asleep, difficulty concentrating or exaggerated startle responses. The symptoms additionally had to have lasted at least one month and to have caused clinically significant distress or impaired functioning.

As psychiatric diagnoses go, PTSD is unusual in requiring that a pattern of symptoms be associated with an event meeting particular criteria. The symptoms themselves are not particularly specific and overlap with those for major depression and generalized anxiety disorder. In fact, when researchers inquire about these symptoms without asking about an event, they often arrive at a diagnosis of major depression.

Applying the criteria for PTSD to cancer

A 2002 review found that studies relying on structured diagnostic interviews yielded estimates of the incidence of PTSD following cancer generally in the range of 2 to 6%, but higher rates (5 to 19%) when self-report questionnaires were used. Yet, we can find dramatic claims in the scientific literature that a third or more cancer patients suffer post-traumatic stress. The basis for these claims are either simply not documented, involve a “bracket creep” or stretching of the criteria for PTSD, or the investigators simply failing to do an adequate job of assessing symptoms and traumatic exposure in a representative sample of cancer patients.

A study by my group involved interviewing 115 consecutive patients with breast cancer in the waiting room of the cancer center. We assumed that all of these women would meet the A1 criterion of having faced an event involved actual or threatened death or threat to their physical integrity. But we assessed whether they had reacted with intense fear, helplessness or horror (A2), and 41% endorsed this item in the interview. However, only 4% of the overall sample met diagnostic criteria for PTSD. We concluded that A2 was a poor indicator of PTSD. Even though an initial intense emotional reaction to a diagnosis of breast cancer was common, PTSD was not. All women diagnosed with PTSD in our sample had a history of depression, raising the issue whether the “PTSD” merely represented a recurrence of major depression.

But most interview studies of PTSD and cancer ask only about these symptoms in connection with cancer, without inquiring whether patients actually consider their cancer experience to be traumatic. Other psychiatric disorders like pre-existing generalized anxiety disorder or major depression are supposed to be ruled out in making a diagnosis of PTSD, but that has not typically been done.

Overall, the most careful interview studies of cancer patients do not find rates of PTSD much different from studies of women in the general population that do not take cancer into consideration.

Reviews of using a trauma framework to understand the experience of most cancer patients have raised some troubling questions. Cancer is different than other events associated with PTSD. Other conditions like exposure to combat or crime or natural disasters are securely in the past. In contrast, cancer has a forward looking component, with cancer patients having legitimate concerns about upcoming treatment, prognosis and recurrence.  Cancer involves continued exposure to threat and actual physical harm by way of disease process or treatment.

Symptoms connected to future events have a very different meaning than symptoms attached to events securely in the past. For instance, a Vietnam veteran endorsing the symptom “a sense of a foreshortened future” decades after the war had ended would be something very different than a cancer patient endorsing the same symptom. Most cancer patients who endorse the A2 criterion of having had a reaction of intense fear to their diagnosis also endorse this particular symptom, but do not go on to meet the criteria for PTSD.

And it is difficult to specify exactly what the event is in cancer. There is the diagnosis, but then there are also treatment decisions, effects of treatments including disfiguring surgery, lingering physical side effects, and recurrences. A number of the symptoms of PTSD like sleep problems distractibility and trouble concentrating can represent simply direct consequences of treatment.

The trouble with self-report questionnaires

Most studies identified in a literature search for “cancer” and “PTSD” involve self-report questionnaires. Such studies are popular because they require less resources than a study involving systematic diagnostic interviews. A researcher can simply have oncology nurses pass out questionnaires or send a research assistant to the waiting room and patients complete questionnaires while they wait for their appointments. Questionnaire studies consistently produce higher estimates of the prevalence than what is obtained when someone actually talks to patients. There is the strong bias in what get published in the scientific literature, with a favoring of higher rather than lower estimates of phenomena. The PTSD literature is no exception. And journalists are more interesting in hearing about a study that claims lots of PTSD among cancer patients than a study that reports little PTSD. So conditions are ripe for publicizing exaggerated estimates of PTSD from questionnaire studies.

But can we infer PTSD from a questionnaire? Questionnaires do not provide an opportunity for investigators to explain to patients what is meant by specific questions or to probe patients’ responses in an interview. Most importantly, there is no opportunity to determine the nature of the symptoms or to rule out other disturbance, such as major depression, crucial to the diagnosis of PTSD. Not surprisingly, questionnaires yield a high proportion of false positives when compared to a diagnostic interview.

The two most commonly used questionnaires with cancer patients are the PTSD Checklist Civilian Version (PCL-C) and Impact of Events Scale (IES).  We need to keep in mind that in interpreting results obtained with questionnaire assessments of PTSD and PTSD symptoms, we are relying on validation data from other, very different populations. For instance, the strongest claims for the validity of the PCL-C come from use from earlier versions of the questionnaire with combat veterans who had their combat experience behind them, but who had a higher probability of PTSD.

Researchers often forget that it is not questionnaires that are validated, but rather their use with a particular population. And, really, when comparisons to psychiatric diagnoses are important, it is not questionnaires with particular populations that are being validated, but particular cutpoints that may differ greatly across populations.

The PCL-C is has 17-items tied to the DSM criteria. Take a look and tried to imagine how a cancer patient would respond if only given the vague instruction that they should answer with respect to cancer. The more validated Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist-Military (PCL-M) anchored the responses with respect to “a stressful military experience.” That was clearer and securely in the past for veterans.

Look also at how vague and nonspecific the specific items are and whether they could apply to a normal reaction to diagnosis and treatment of cancer. Some of the items such as 1 and 4 or 4 and 5 could be endorsed on the basis of the same experience. Consider not only the dilemma of the patient trying to figure out how to complete the questionnaire, but researchers trying to make sense of the responses when the patient is no longer there to probe. Note too how some of this vagueness is lost when we focus on responses of “moderately” to “extremely”. But what is to be made of “a little bit” or “moderately”, the more typical responses of cancer patients?

I doubt that many cancer researchers ever stop and ponder the appropriateness of their instruments in this fashion. Rather, they assume that cancer is traumatic without checking out the assumption with the patients they are studying and they assume their measures of valid simply because they have been used a lot previously. So, they start with some conventional assumptions, don’t really put them to a test in choosing an off-the-shelf questionnaire. When they write up their results, they can assume that reviewers will mostly share their unexamined assumptions.

The IES can be found here and it is even worse than the PCL-C for studying cancer patients. It is notoriously nonspecific in the content of its items. Some items are quite neutral, like “I had dreams about it.” Uncritical use of the IES  risks of casting normal reactions to a diagnosis of cancer or even the physical symptoms of cancer treatment as symptoms of a psychiatric disorder.

The IES  was not originally constructed to diagnose PTSD and it misses some constellations of symptoms contributing to a diagnosis. It misses hyperarousal symptoms altogether and does not cover some avoidance or intrusion symptoms. was supposed to have separate intrusive thoughts and avoidance subscales, but this factor structure does not hold up in its use with cancer patients. Rather, the items seem to converge on a general distress factor.

One investigator administered the IES to a group of college students who were asked to fill it out with respect to a TV program that they had particularly disliked in the past week. Not necessarily a frightening program, only a bad one. The students scored in a range that substantially overlapped with the scores obtained from breast cancer patients. This says a lot about the nonspecificity of the IES and the difficulty making sense of responses.

Partial PTSD and subsyndromal PTSD syndromes

Researchers frequently find that average scores for cancer patients are not in the range that they anticipated and that even with questionnaires, the prevalence of PTSD is low. Not to be deterred, researchers have postulated partial PTSD and subsyndromal PTSD.

For instance, one study found that the prevalence of PTSD was low in persons who were previously diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma and that the rates were no higher than among their siblings. The researchers constructed “partial PTSD” from patients who met the A1 criterion of the direct experience of an event involving death, injury, or threat to the physical integrity of oneself or another person and symptoms from only two of the three needed clusters for a diagnosis of PTSD (i.e., reexperiencing, avoidance, arousal). So, someone could meet a diagnosis of partial PTSD by endorsing feeling that future plans would not come true and by being upset when reminded of the events or having thoughts are images of it.

Note a couple of things about the study and its results. The A2 criterion was dropped and patients did not need to have the minimum criterion of number of symptoms within the clusters, only to have one symptom in that cluster. Finally, most of the patients who endorsed A1 criterion for cancer endorsed another event in their lives as having been the worst in their lives. Although the cancer patients were labeled “survivors,” a quarter of them experienced a relapse since last assessment. Thus, the threat of cancer was real in the current lives, not securely in the past.

The researchers nonetheless concluded that their finding

“underscores the importance of future research detailing the psychological and functional outcomes and survivors with partial PTSD and of careful clinical practice that assesses for functional impairment secondary partial PTSD symptomatology, and male and female survivors, even years after completion of therapy.”

I think this study, which is rather typical, but even more careful than most, shows how resistant the idea of cancer being traumatic is to being refuted by data. Furthermore, when one examines this and similar studies, one gets the impression that little recognition is being given to persons who have been diagnosed with cancer continuing to have a realistic threat in their lives.

Just what is partial PTSD, anyway? We cannot assume patients who endorse a few nonspecific symptoms have a budding posttraumatic stress disorder–Most will not develop it—anymore than we can said that a couple of weeks of sore throat represents partial esophageal cancer.

Normal reactions to a diagnosis of cancer

After receiving a diagnosis of breast cancer, about a third of women, maybe slightly more, will score above a cutpoint on a measure of general distress. Efforts to distinguish between anxiety and depression symptoms with self-report have generally proved unsuccessful. Items intended to go with the anxiety subscale often correlate as highly with the depression subscale and vice versa. Assessed a few months afterwards, most formerly distressed cancer patients will not still be distressed, even if they have not gotten formal mental health interventions. It’s estimated that only about 8% of cancer patients have persistent distress, and such chronic distress represents other things going on in their lives or pre-existing vulnerability to psychiatric disorder.

It’s not that cancer patients don’t benefit from support and attention in greater understanding of their illness and its treatments, it’s just that specially mental health treatment is not generally indicated nor even accepted.

In an as yet unpublished study, my group systematically screened cancer patients for distress and offering enrollment in a clinical trial providing a free problem-solving intervention to those who were distressed. As in other studies, we find that little more than a third of the patients were distressed enough to qualify for the intervention. But few of them were interested. We estimate that we have to spend 28 hours of screening in order to get one patient into the study.

The “third or more are distressed” may sound high, but it is the same proportion of patients scoring above the cutpoint for distress in primary care settings. The difference between the waiting rooms of cancer care in the primary care is that many of the patients in cancer care are displaying a reaction to an acute event that will dissipate within the normal support and attention they get in cancer care.

You would never know from the introductions to most papers on distress in cancer patients that more cancer patients score below the cutpoint for significant distress than above.

Self-report measures of “posttraumatic stress” are strongly correlated with self-report measures of general distress, more so than they are with interview measures of PTSD. It may sound more impressive to label this emotional distress as posttraumatic stress, but it is pretentious and misleading. Posttraumatic stress disorder, when properly diagnosed, is a rather chronic condition with accumulating impairments in social and personal functioning if its sufferers go untreated. It gives the wrong message to cancer patients to label them as having posttraumatic stress.

There are empirically recommended treatments for PTSD, many involving re-exposure to the threatening situation and cognitive reprocessing over and over again until the situation is judged not as threatening. I don’t think that such exposure therapy or cognitive reprocessing therapy has been tried with cancer patients, and I doubt that many would accept it. But that would be the recommendation if we took seriously the notion that cancer patients were suffering full or partial PTSD.

Misapplications of the trauma framework to cancer

There are plenty of examples of misunderstanding and misinformation stemming from application of a trauma framework to cancer.

In a past blog post, I showed how the cancer patients experiencing relapses and re-treatments were misunderstood as having psychiatric issues. Researchers felt that there was a “strong message” for mental health interventions to be provided, based on patient endorsements of items that probably represented return of physical symptoms and side effects of treatment for recurrent cancer.

It would seem perfectly normal for these patients to be physically sickened and dismayed by the recurrences and  renewed treatment. I really doubt most would want to see a psychiatrist.

In another blog post, I showed how researchers frightened cancer patients with the suggestion that any emotional response registered on the IES might accelerate the progression of their cancer and death. Press coverage of the study in a newsletter to psychiatrists was headlined No Time to Waste: Avoidant Coping Style Scrambles Circadian Rhythms in Breast Cancer Patients. The press coverage actually conveyed the hype and exaggerations of the peer-reviewed article rather accurately. Elevations in the the IES were related to sleep patterns, with the inference being made that there was  ‘no time to waste’ for breast cancer patients to seek mental health interventions to reduce their emotional distress.  This is irresponsible nonsense, but will succeed in misleading cancer patients who want to do everything they can to survive their cancer.

Both of these examples come from respectable peer-reviewed journals.

There’s a whole variety of not so respectable sources that offer bogus treatments to patients, selling them on the idea that somehow cancer is a kind of psychosomatic disease, so that addressing the psychological concerns will extend their lives. The offensive message is that if cancer patients do not get better control of their emotional experience, they are responsible for aggravating their physical health.

Then there is a whole  literature prescribing how patients should respond emotionally to cancer. Cancer may be traumatic, they are told, but it is incumbent upon them to find a benefit in it an opportunity for personal growth. There is no evidence that patients who report benefits from having cancer or growing psychologically from the experience are anymore adjusted than patients who do not. And there is considerable evidence that claims of positive psychological changes from having cancer are often defensive illusions. I will have more to say about that in future blog posts, but with great humor and insight Barbara Ehrenerich has described her experiences being forced to leave a  support group when she held to her idea that there was no benefit to cancer and rather than wanting to find growth from it, she was simply mad as hell. I recommend her book Bright-sided (titled Smile or Die in Europe) or a review that can be found here.

Postscript: It remains amazingly easy to publish inaccurate nonsense in high impact journals about cancer being routinely traumatic. For discussion of yet another example, see  Will understanding cancer as a trauma improve outcomes for low income, minority women?

Category: Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , , | 2 Comments

Shhh! Keeping quiet about the sad state of couples interventions for cancer patients research

Special thanks to Ioana Cristea and Nilufer Kafescioglu who co-authored the commentary with me discussed in this blog post.

I recall a Monty Python skit in which clever government officials solved a housing crisis by hiring the famed hypnotist El Mystico to put up 50 hypnosis-induced 25 story blocks. Of course, the illusion was always threatened by someone falling out of trance and noticing that there was actually no housing. If residents stopped believing, the entire housing complex would fall down. El Mystico was kept busy, watching for people coming out of trance and hypnotizing them again.

Tenant: we received a note from the Council saying that if we ceased to believe in this building it would fall down.

Voice Over: You don’t mind living in a figment of another man’s imagination?

Tenant: No, it’s much better than where we used to live.

This skit can serve as a metaphor for whole areas of psychotherapy and psychosocial intervention research that are dominated by small, similarly flawed studies, but in which the illusion of a solid body of work is nervously protected against anyone noticing differently.

My recent blog post examining the Triple P Parenting Program literature found that expensive implementations of that program were being justified by data that did not actually support its effectiveness. In this particular case, the illusion was preserved by undeclared financial conflicts of interest of those generating these little studies, but also dominating the peer review process. Null trials were kept from being published or spun to looking like positive trials, and any criticism was suppressed by negative peer reviews recommending rejection.

Most often, in psychotherapy research at least, there are no such obvious financial interests in play. Peer review typically draws upon persons who are identified as experts in an area of research. That sounds reasonable, except that in areas of research dominated by similarly flawed studies, we cannot reasonably expect peer reviewers to be overly critical of studies that share the same flaws as their own.

And then there is the problem of peer reviewers who should be fairer, but whose objectivity is overridden by worry that the credibility of the field would be damaged by any tough tell-it-like-it-is critique. Such well-meaning reviewers may recommend rejection of a manuscript solely on the basis of the authors not playing nice by offering constructive suggestions, rather than commenting on the flaws in the literature that no one else is willing to acknowledge. Conspiracies of silence can develop so that no one comments on the obvious, and anyone inclined to do so is kept out of the published literature.

Systematic reviews and meta-analyses provide opportunities for recognizing larger patterns in a literature and acknowledging the difficulty or impossibility of drawing firm conclusions as to whether interventions actually work from available studies. Yet, too often reviewers simply put lipstick on a pig of a literature, and comment how beautiful it is. Once such summaries are published, the likelihood decreases that anyone will go back to the primary studies and find the flaws, rather than relying on the secondary source that is now available.

married breast cancerIn this blog post, I am going to focus on studies of couples interventions for cancer patients, a literature that is dominated by small studies that share similar flaws. Recently, a meta-analyses appeared  in Psycho-Oncology that discreetly avoided commenting on the important limitations of available studies. My colleagues and I attempted to publish a brief commentary on it, but we got sandbagged by defensive reviewers. I’ll be discussing both the meta-analysis and the sandbagging.  Here is the abstract of the meta-analysis, which is unfortunately not open access. But I if you write to the lead author hoda.badr@mssm.edu, she will surely send you a PDF.

The authors’ systematic search succeeded in identifying 23 randomized trials, 20 of which could provide effect sizes for inclusion in a meta-analysis.  The authors provided a table in which every single study reported at least one positive finding. Does that suggest that all is well in this literature, with positive results consistently occurring?

It so happens that one of the couple studies in the table was already the focus of a critical analysis in another of my blog posts. I identified inflated claims in its abstract and I described how, more generally, abstracts often distort findings reported in the results sections of articles. I gave some tips as to what to look for. Because many readers only look at an abstract without actually going to the article, distorted abstracts can perpetuate hype that does not get corrected. I’m quite sure that many of the other studies reported in the table are summarized on the basis of what appears in their abstracts, not their actual results.

As an example, one group of investigators apparently radically altered their design after results were known. The two-group design became a three-group design, with a new group created from patients assigned to the intervention who did not receive any exposure to it. The abstract reported positive effects for couples who received the intervention, leaving out those who were assigned to the intervention, but for whatever reason did not receive it.

Reproduced below is Figure 1 from the article [you can doubleclick on it to expand it], which presents forest plots of findings which are different than the glowing assessments offered in the table in the article. For instance, the overall effect size obtained from summarizing all the studies of patients’ distress was small (.25 ). Yet, curiously only two studies—rather than all of them– individually obtained a significant effect.  Not all studies that are listed in the table report effects for distress, but all that are reported are positive.

review and meta-analysis of psychosocial interventions for couples-001One of these studies was small (30 couples per group) and obtained only what the original study authors characterized as a “small” effect for patient distress (d= .22), not the 5 times bigger (d = 1.1) one displayed in the forest plot. The other had an adequately sized sample and a significant effect on patient outcomes. Unfortunately, when we and others have attempted to enter this study into meta-analyses, we consistently find that it is such an outlier that it cannot be considered a member of the same class as the rest of the interventions. This raises questions about its validity, unless the intervention happens to be spectacularly effective. Arguing against this possibility, the authors did not succeed in getting a significant effect for this intervention with another sample of cancer patients. This trial should have been excluded, as it has been in other meta analyses, leaving the one small positive trial.

As also seen in the figure above, a forest plot of findings for effects on spouse levels of distress similarly finds a small, significant effect (.21), with only one underpowered individual study being able to reject the null hypothesis of no effect.

Our critique that did not get published

The critique that we attempted to publish pointed out that 9 of the 20 studies entered into the meta-analysis had 35 or less patients per group/cell. The ability of an intervention trial of that size to detect a moderately sized significant effect, even if it is present, is less than 50% per trial. So, even if these interventions were amazingly and consistently effective, only half of these trials should report so. Think of it– what we see reported for these studies is the equivalent of flipping a coin 9 times and getting all heads. That all of these trials were described as positive in the authors’ table 2 suggests that there is confirmatory publication bias.

When we examined these 20 trials for methodological quality, we found that pervasive deficiencies that are typically associated with bias. Almost all of the trials suffered loss of couples from follow up, and results were based on whichever patients could be contacted. Any of a number of statistical strategies that could have reduced this particular bias were not applied. There was thus a lack of intention to treat analyses which would have provided more conservative and accurate estimates of patient outcomes.

There was almost no evidence that any of these trials had specified a primary outcome ahead of time. Rather, investigators typically administered a number of measures and were free to pick the one that made the trial look best. That is termed selective outcome reporting. Because it had been happening so much in the medical literature, high impact medical journals now require investigators to register their designs and their primary outcomes in a publicly accessible place before they even run the first patient. No pre-registration means no publication in the journal. No such reforms have taken hold in the psychotherapy literature.

Finally, none of these trials presented evidence that the investigators had decided upon a particular sample size ahead of time and achieved that sample. The issue is that the investigators could monitor incoming data and either cease data collection when a significant result appeared or keep collecting data with the hope that one did.

We did not invent these criteria for risk of bias. They are routinely used for assessing bias in the studies being entered in the highly respected Cochrane collaboration meta-analyses.  We were simply invoking the standards that are accepted elsewhere for randomized trials.

What we thus found was that this entire literature was at high risk of bias because investigators were in a position to manipulate what they claimed were the results by to actually stop the trial when results were at their best, selective analyses of patients who stuck around to provide data, by selecting what outcome measures should be designated for emphasis after the running of the trial, and. All of these problems are compounded by having less than minimal sample sizes to obtain consistently a moderate size effect, if it is there.  These biases would be eliminated if investigators were required to register their designs ahead of time, including primary outcomes and sample size and if they were also not allowed to peek at their data as it came in and to HARK—hypothesize after the results are known.

The evidence is that a published collection of small trials paradoxically often report bigger effects than a collection of larger trials. That can be a number of reasons for this, but an obvious one is a publication bias. If a small trial does not get in effect, reviewers and editors will reject the trial for publication because one should none should have been expected. However, if by chance or bias, such a trial can made to appear to have gotten a positive effect, it is published and the intervention is celebrated as so powerful that it can demonstrate effectiveness even when one would not expect it.

There are various statistical strategies for compensating for the presence of small studies in a meta-analysis that also incorporates larger studies. But these require a larger number of studies to work with, and, most importantly, there is no means of compensating for such a preponderance of studies that are not only small, but similarly flawed. You cannot take studies of pervasively low methodological quality and combine them in a meta-analysis in a way that overcomes their flaws.

There is good evidence that we got sandbagged by reviewers, and I think the editors suspected that in continuing to solicit reviews until five had been received.

The sandbagging

One reviewer simply recommended against publication because we did not make a significant contribution to the literature but did not explain that judgment.

Another reviewer got personal:

Coyne was cited in the acknowledgements of Badr and Krebs’ paper, meaning that he reviewed it prior to it going for peer review, which raises serious  questions about what Coyne’s real ‘agenda’  is and the credibility of his argument.

This is a cheap shot.  I was not even the first author on the commentary, I did not see the final version of the manuscript, and I did not grant approval of being listed in the acknowledgment. Most journals require anyone being listed in the acknowledgments to provide approval. This requirement came about because of authors listing people in the acknowledgments without their permission. This strategy was used to exclude these people as possible reviewers and also to suggest to other reviewers that someone was endorsing the manuscript. After I complained, the journal removed my name from the acknowledgments in the PDF available at the website.

The reviewer continued with a technical defense of meta-analysis as being able to overcome the bias of small studies

….the underlying premise of meta-analysis is that even though any or all individual studies might be flawed in one respect or another, when pooled together, they all provide an estimate of the true effect size. Third, Badr and Krebs used Hedges’ g, which corrects for small sample bias. Fourth, Badr and Krebs assessed fail-safe N values, which indicated that a substantial number of ‘hidden’ null studies would have been required to reduce the summary effect sizes to non-significance.

I commend this reviewer for knowing the lingo, but he misapplies it. Hedges’ g offer some correction for small trials, but cannot correct for their sharing methodological flaws. And the meta analysis authors did not assess failsafe N, which involves estimating the number of null studies that had to remain unpublished to counter impressions based on only published studies. Calculating failsafe N was once quite fashionable in psychology, but it has long been abandoned elsewhere because it provides inflated estimates of the strength and quality of a literature.

And then there was the criticism from one reviewer that we should have reconsidered whether our standard criteria should even be applied to couples studies. Apparently, there should be a special dispensation granted. We

….point out, rightly so, that the failure to explicitly assign a primary outcome a priori gives researchers license to select positive findings and under-report null or adverse findings. While it is true that many intervention trials are prone to these temptations (in and outside of psycho-oncology), it is also true that the notion of a “primary outcome” may need to be reconsidered when testing relational, systemic interventions that target individual and dyad-level variables.

Another reviewer objected that we should not be criticizing studies in journals where they did not appear. Okay, but we also disallowed from criticizing a meta-analysis that depended on them?

It not clear that this is the best forum for critiquing studies in other journals, which were published up to 10 years ago and before the guidelines for reporting randomized trials were often required by journals.

And then there was the damning of us as being negative without offering positive suggestions.

The major weakness of this paper is that it reads somewhat like an unfavorable manuscript review, and falls short of offering creative and forward-thinking ways of addressing the unique challenges of couple and family intervention research.

Whither our attempted criticism of couples research?

Although quite harsh, only one of the five reviewers recommended outright rejection of our commentary, but a number suggested that we be limited to a 400 word letter to the editor with one reference. Based on their near unanimity, the editor rejected our appeal and so we will have the thankless exercise of condensing all our concerns into 400 words. Such strict limits on post publication commentary arose in an era when paper journals were worried about using their scarce page restrictions with letters to the editor. However, this particular journal no longer publishes a paper edition, and so the editor really should reconsider the tokenism of a 400 word letter.

But we got a symposium accepted for the July 2013 European Health Psychology conference in Bordeaux, France where we will discuss this whole affair. Be there! And we are negotiating an extended publication about this at another journal, based on this blog post.

Whither research concerning couples interventions for cancer patients?

The sad state of research concerning couples interventions for cancer patients is that results of underpowered, similarly flawed studies are being spun to create the illusion of a strong body of evidence that these interventions are effective. Meta-analyses such as the one we critiqued falsely reassure patients, clinicians, other researchers, and policy makers that couples interventions are effective when there is not yet quality evidence for this claim.

Those who are responsible for the illusion should consider an unanticipated consequence of it. It is an inevitable that sooner or later critics with less of an investment in the status quo will expose the limitations of this research. In the interim, time will have been lost accumulating methodologically sophisticated research because of the appearance that no further research is needed. I can point to the loss of NIMH interest in funding research concerning couples intervention for depression a few decades ago because of illusion that these interventions had already proved effective.

It is challenging to do meaningful studies of couples interventions for cancer patients. A while ago I corresponded with the author of one of the studies included in the meta analysis and inquired what completion of the study entailed, which happened to be her PhD thesis. She said

Difficulty recruiting couples is one major issue, and taking steps that enhance this process can be like a second project in itself. Over the course of the project I drove 140,000 kilometers, and a further two therapists drove around 20,000 kilometers each.

She noted the many features of the study that contributed to the relatively high rate of recruitment in her study: social marketing strategies to publicize the study, use of chart reviews to identify women potentially eligible for the study who could be personally approached and contacted by study staff, enlistment of oncologists in expressing enthusiasm for patients’ participation in the study, and the tailoring of the home-based intervention to the schedules and preferences of the women and their husbands. These are heroic efforts, perhaps crucial to the completion of the project, but are unlikely to occur in routine community cancer care. And most couples researchers do not adopt them.

Yet there is a larger issue in this couples research that presents greater challenges. A consensus is emerging in the literature concerning psychosocial interventions that studies that do not select patients for heightened distress are unlikely to be able to show that interventions are effective. There were signals in results of previous null trials, but they were obscured by spinning and confirmatory bias. Negative trials were recast to be positive and got published.

The null trials occur because most patients who are drawn to participate in trials are not sufficiently distressed to register clinically significant improvement—what is called a floor effect. Intervention studies are now struggling to recruit sufficient numbers of distressed cancer patients and discovering that only a minority of cancer patients found to be distressed in routine screening are interested in participating in intervention trials, even when treatment is free. So far, few studies that restrict samples to distressed patients, and it is likely that multisite trials will be necessary in the future to recruit adequate samples.

Investigators of couples interventions are still hiding from the likelihood that these trials are recruiting patients who are insufficiently distressed to demonstrate that interventions are effective. The implications are more challenging for couples than for individual interventions. The prevalent expectation that couples interventions can improve both patient and spouse distress levels may be unrealistic. There is a reliable phenomenon that gender predicts distress levels in couples with cancer better than knowing whether someone in a couple with cancer is the patient or the spouse. Husbands of breast cancer patients on average are not more distressed than married men whose partner is not a cancer patient. Similarly, wives of prostate patients tend to be more distressed than the men themselves, who have low levels of psychological distress. Couples in which both partners have clinically significant levels of distress are in a small minority, in part because of men not reaching clinically significant levels of distress, regardless whether they are the patients or the spouses.

Reform is possible. While it would take a while to implement preregistration of trials, steps could be taken immediately to bring claims in abstracts in greater alignment with the results are actually reported. Furthermore, journals can cease to publish underpowered trials or at least insist upon acknowledgment of their limitations and that authors avoid of hype. They could make a greater effort to publish transparent reporting of null trials and stop punishing honesty. And they could insist that reviewers who evaluate meta analysis have some minimal level of competency.

In future blogs I will give more attention to sandbagging, which is jsut one of a number of significant risk to relying exclusively peer review and expecting a fair and accurate evaluation of the evidence in the published literature. Sandbagging helps explain John Ioannidis’ observation that consistency of published findings is often only an index of the popularity of particular point of view, not the strength of evidence.

Sandbagged manuscripts were once buried and forgotten. Fortunately, there are now blogs like this one in which we can present our criticisms of the literature, expose sandbagging reviewers and alert readers to the editorial decisions that keep criticism suppressed. Blogging will have to suffice until journals provide the support for the post-publication commentary  needed to correct for the inevitable failings of peer review.

 

.

Category: Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , , | 1 Comment